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Abstract
[Excerpt] The 1983 report, A Nation at Risk, of the National Commission on Excellence in Education decried
the state of public education in the United States and suggested a number of reforms. Among their
recommendations was increased federal aid for education. The view was that this would lead to desirable
outcomes such as reduced class sizes and higher teacher salaries, with the latter aiding in the recruitment and
retention of high-quality teachers.
Somewhat surprisingly, previous research on the economics of education provides us with very few insights
about what the effects of such proposals might be. For example, while there is an extensive literature on the
determinants of cross-section variations in teachers' salaries and teacher/student ratios, virtually nothing has
been written on how changes in aid levels influence changes in salaries, teacher/student ratios, other
expenditure levels, and local tax rates. Similarly, while there are many studies of how grants-in-aid affect
overall expenditure levels and some studies of the determinants of cross-section variations in the share of
expenditures spent on various categories (e.g., instructional and administrative), virtually nothing has been
written on how changes in aid affect the various expenditure shares.
To provide answers to some of these questions, our paper examines data from a panel of approximately 700
school districts in New York State over a five-year period (1978-79 to 1982-83) and tries to infer how school
districts will respond to future changes in aid from how they responded to changes in state aid during the
period. We focus on how past aid changes have influenced teacher salaries, tax rates, teacher/student ratios,
and other staff/student ratios. The analyses exploit the fact that although school aid formulas change
frequently in New York State, each district is usually guaranteed at least the same aid level as the previous year
("save harmless" provisions). As a result, over any given two-year period, the percentage increase in aid varies
widely across districts. This provides a convenient form of natural experiment.
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On Estimating the Effects of 
Increased Aid to Education 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg and Richard P. Chaykowski 
9.1 Introduction 
The 1983 report, A Nation at Risk, of the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education decried the state of public education in the 
United States and suggested a number of reforms. Among their rec-
ommendations was increased federal aid for education. The view was 
that this would lead to desirable outcomes such as reduced class sizes 
and higher teacher salaries, with the latter aiding in the recruitment 
and retention of high-quality teachers. 
Somewhat surprisingly, previous research on the economics of ed-
ucation provides us with very few insights about what the effects of 
such proposals might be. For example, while there is an extensive 
literature on the determinants of cross-section variations in teachers' 
salaries and teacher/student ratios, virtually nothing has been written 
on how changes in aid levels influence changes in salaries, teacher/ 
student ratios, other expenditure levels, and local tax rates.1 Similarly, 
while there are many studies of how grants-in-aid affect overall ex-
penditure levels and some studies of the determinants of cross-section 
variations in the share of expenditures spent on various categories (e.g., 
instructional and administrative), virtually nothing has been written on 
how changes in aid affect the various expenditure shares.2 
Ronald G. Ehrenberg is Irving M. Ives Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations 
and Economics, Cornell University, and research associate of the National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Richard P. Chaykowski is assistant professor, Department of Eco-
nomics and School of Industrial Relations, Queen's University, Canada. 
This research was partially supported by the NBER's Public Sector Labor Relations 
project. However, the authors alone are responsible for the contents of this paper. 
Without implicating him for what remains, the authors are extremely grateful to Richard 
Murnane for his detailed comments on an earlier draft. 
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To provide answers to some of these questions, our paper examines 
data from a panel of approximately 700 school districts in New York 
State over a five-year period (1978-79 to 1982-83) and tries to infer 
how school districts will respond to future changes in aid from how 
they responded to changes in state aid during the period. We focus on 
how past aid changes have influenced teacher salaries, tax rates, teacher/ 
student ratios, and other staff/student ratios. The analyses exploit the 
fact that although schobl aid formulas change frequently in New York 
State, each district is usually guaranteed at least the same aid level as 
the previous year ("save harmless" provisions). As a result, over any 
given two-year period, the percentage increase in aid varies widely 
across districts. This provides a convenient form of natural experiment. 
The organization of our paper is as follows. Section 9.2 discusses 
how state aid to education in New York State was allocated to school 
districts in 1978-79 and then how the allocation formulas changed 
during the sample period. Section 9.3 describes our methodological 
approach and the data base we have collected. Empirical results are 
presented in section 9.4, which is then followed by some brief con-
cluding remarks. 
9.2 State Aid to Education in New York State 
By far the largest form of state aid to education in New York State3 
is general operating aid; this category ranged between 68 and 75 percent 
of total state aid during the sample years. Operating aid is based on an 
aid-ratio formulation in which low "wealth" districts receive more aid 
than high "wealth" districts. Specifically, the state establishes two 
expenditure/pupil levels, EL and EH, and then for average "wealth" 
districts pays 49 percent of district operating expenditures up to EL 
and 20 percent of any district operating expenditures between EL and 
EH. For other districts, the share paid by the state of expenditures up 
to EL is 
(1) rn = (1 - (Wi/W) * .51), 
and the share paid by the state of expenditures between EL and EH is 
(2) ra = 0 " (IVf) * -8). 
In these equations Wt and Yt are measures of the district's wealth 
relative to the number of "aidable pupil units" in the district, while W 
and Fare comparable statewide average measures. "Aidable pupil units" 
depend upon average daily attendance in the district, with extra weight 
being given for secondary school pupils, handicapped pupils, and pupils 
with special needs (those who scored low on standardized tests). 
Throughout the sample period, W{ and W were always based on the 
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full value of property, and Yt and Y were similarly defined through 
1980-81. However, in 1981-82 and 1982-83 the latter were redefined 
in terms of 1979 and 1980 community income, respectively (as reported 
from Internal Revenue Service records). 
The level of general operating aid received by a district changes over 
time because of changes in EL and EH (these grew from $1,450 and 
$1,500 in 1978-79 to $1,885 and $2,155 by 1982-83, with the magnitude 
of the increase varying widely across years), changes in district wealth 
and school enrollment (both relative to statewide changes), and changes 
in the definition of wealth (in eq. [2]) in the latter two years.4 In addition, 
"save harmless" provisions were always in effect. They stated that 
general operating aid could never be reduced, typically either on a total 
or per pupil basis, with the school district allowed to choose the option 
that was most beneficial to it. As a result school districts in which 
wealth was increasing rapidly or enrollments declining did not have to 
face a loss of general aid. These "save harmless" provisions substan-
tially influenced the distribution of state aid; for example in 1979-80 
over 35 percent (249) of the districts received aid under them. 
In principle, the level of general operating aid received by a district 
might also increase simply because the district had increased its per 
pupil expenditures. That is, as long as the district was spending less 
than EH, increases in expenditures (up to EH) would induce increases 
in state aid through the matching formulas (eqs. [1] and [2]). In such 
a situation, it would not be meaningful to refer to an increase in aid 
"causing" the expenditure increase. However, the majority of districts 
appeared to have spent more than EH each year, so this concern is 
probably not relevant for our data. 
Although general operating aid is by far the largest component of 
state aid to education in New York, numerous other forms of aid exist. 
Some, like transportation aid (which comprises typically 10 percent of 
total aid), are based on formulas in which the state pays a specified 
share of mandated costs. Others, like construction aid, are based on a 
sharing of actual expenses. These latter categories, however, represent 
only a small share of total aid. 
Of special interest to us are two other forms of aid that existed during 
at least part of the period. First, in 1979-80, prior to the inclusion of 
income as a measure of wealth in the general operating aid formula, 
the state instituted a "low-income aid" component of school aid; this 
provided between $1.76 (highest income district) and $27.50 (lowest 
income district) on a per pupil basis. This type of aid represented 
roughly 10 percent of the increase in state aid that occurred that year. 
Second, each year the state provided special aid programs for "city" 
school districts. In most school districts in New York State the voters 
implicitly set the tax rate each year via budget referenda. In city dis-
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tricts, however, the tax rate is set by local school boards, subject to 
the rate not exceeding a state constitutionally determined maximum. 
The special aid programs for these city districts were designed to help 
out those districts that were near their constitutional maximum tax rate 
and to help other city school systems meet special needs that their 
districts faced. 
Because of all of the above provisions and other types of aid to 
education, the percentage change in total aid varied widely across 
school districts in any given year. As mentioned above, this provides 
a convenient form of natural experiment in which we can try to infer 
how districts would respond to changes in federal aid in the future from 
observations on how they have responded to changes in state aid in 
the past. In much of what follows we shall treat these aid changes as 
exogenous; however, our discussion suggests that a district's percent-
age changes in full value of property, in enrollment, in level of income, 
and whether the district is a city school district, all influenced the 
district's percentage change in state aid in a highly nonlinear manner 
that both varied from year to year and depended upon whether a "save 
harmless" provision was an effective constraint on a district in a given 
year. As a consequence, in places below we have attempted to obtain 
instrumental variable estimates for changes in aid and have used these 
in our analyses. 
9.3 Methodological Framework and Data 
The outcomes we focus on are percentage changes in teachers' sal-
aries—minimum salary with a bachelor's degree (PI), maximum with 
a bachelor's degree CP2), minimum with a master's degree (P3), and 
maximum with a master's degree (PA)—percentage changes in the prop-
erty tax rate on the full value of property in the district (P5), and 
percentage changes in staff per pupil ratios—teacher/pupil (P6), non-
professional staff/pupil (PI), other professional staff/pupil (PS), and 
paraprofessional staff/student (P9).5 Given the initial level of these 
outcomes that prevail in a school district in a period, their percentage 
changes are determined by a complex process that involves bargaining 
between a school board and a union and, in the case of small districts 
in New York State, a voter referendum on the proposed school district 
budget. Rather than attempting to model this process formally, we 
pursue a strategy of estimating reduced-form equations of the form: 
(3) Pi = F(Gg, Y, A, N, Z, CB, d, £,), / = 1, 2, . . . 9 . 
Here G is the annual percentage change in state aid received by the 
school district; this is multiplied by the base-year share of state aid in 
the district's budget (g) to allow the effects of percentage changes in 
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aid to depend upon aid's initial "importance" to the district. Fand A 
are the percentage changes in income and the full value of property in 
the district, respectively; they are measures of changes in the district's 
ability to pay for education.6 N is the percentage change in student 
enrollment in the district. Z is a vector of sociodemographic variables 
expected to influence the community's "taste" for education and hence 
the various outcomes (e.g., community education level, student test 
scores, percent of households with children). CB is a vector of collec-
tive bargaining contract provisions (to be discussed below), while d is 
a dummy variable that indicates whether the school district is a "city" 
school district where tax rates are set by the school board (subject to 
constitutional tax limitations) rather than by the voters in an annual 
budget referendum. Finally, Bh which differs for each outcome, is a 
measure of the base-period position of the district on a variable relating 
to the outcome. 
A description of the specific variables included in each equation and 
their sources are found in the notes to table 9.1 As indicated there, we 
have collected data from a variety of sources for over 700 school dis-
tricts in New York State for a five-year period (1978-79 to 1982-83). 
Since the outcome variables are expressed as changes, a maximum 
sample size of roughly 2,800 observations exists. However, due to 
missing data and problems, described below, actual sample sizes are 
much smaller. 
The teacher salary variables were available only for school districts 
represented by the New York State United Teachers, an AFL-CIO 
affiliate, and hence districts represented by National Education As-
sociation (NEA) locals were excluded from the wage equations. These 
salary data had to be hand-coded from printed material, and many gaps 
in the data further reduced sample sizes. In addition, one might argue 
that since teacher contracts are often multiyear in nature, the process 
governing the outcomes may differ in years when collective bargaining 
negotiations took place. Consequently, results are presented below for 
both year-district observations when negotiations took place (table 9.1) 
and all observations (table 9.2) In the latter case, a dummy variable 
for whether negotiations took place in the year is included as a separate 
explanatory variable.7 
Three collective bargaining contract provision variables are included 
in the analyses.8 The first two capture the presence of employment-
related provisions in the agreement, while the third represents a mea-
sure of bargaining strength. The first variable indicates the presence 
or absence of a provision governing staff reductions. The second vari-
able indicates the presence or absence of a provision affecting the 
determination of class size. Together, the presence of these variables 
capture the extent to which the collective bargaining agreement 
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constrains employer discretion over the determination of employment 
levels: staff reduction procedures affect the level of employment di-
rectly, while class size provisions affect employment levels indirectly. 
The third variable is a contract strength index that is meant to capture 
the relative bargaining power of the union. It is the sum of the number 
of times that other provisions that unions might want in a contract 
appear (with a maximum score of 58). Ceteris paribus, the higher the 
contract index the more bargaining power the union has and thus the 
more favorably the outcomes in equation (3) will be to the union. 
The city school district dummy variable is included to test whether 
the way tax rates are set influences the growth rate of taxes and/or the 
other outcome variables. One's intuition is that when voters directly 
vote on tax increases that the rate of increase is likely to be lower. 
The measure of the base period salary positions of teachers (5,-) is 
taken to be the initial category (BAmin, BAmax, MAmin, MAmax) 
salary in the district relative to the comparable category's salary av-
erage across districts in the county. For all other outcomes, the base 
period variable is taken to be the initial level of the variable. We expect 
that the phenomenon of "regression to the mean" will cause each of 
these base period variables to be negatively related to the percentage 
change in the outcome. 
Finally, among the sociodemographic variables included in the anal-
yses was an index of student test scores in the district relative to the 
statewide average during the 1979-80 to 1981-82 period. In each of 
the three years covered by this period, all third and sixth graders in 
New York State were given standardized math and reading tests. A 
"state reference point" was established for each test in each year; 
students who scored below this point were deemed to have special 
needs and to require remedial help. Letting S(i, j , t) be the proportion 
of students in district / who scored below the state reference point on 
test j in year t and S(A, j , t) the comparable proportion statewide for 
testy in year t, we define a district's relative test score index as 
(4) *,- = n ( « i i , 0 « ( A , j W ) ] , 
where t = 79-80, 80-81, 81-82 and j = 3R,3M,6R,6M. 
Low scores for R{ indicate districts whose students performed better 
on the standardized tests. 
9.4 Empirical Results 
Table 9.1 presents estimates of the change in outcome equations, 
with the sample restricted to year-observation combinations in which 
Table 9.1 Change in Outcome Equations: Restricted to Observations Where Negotiations Took Place in Year (absolute value t statistic) 
Px Pi Pi PA PS Pe Pi P* P9 
c 
x\ 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
X6 
X7 
xs 
X9 
X\0 
X\\ 
X\2 
X\2> 
X\4 
X\5 
X\6 
X\l 
x\% 
X\9 
X2b 
X2\ 
X12 
*23 
X24 
*25 
0.070 (2.2) 
-0.045 (1.7) 
0.001 (0.3) 
-0.040 (1.4) 
0.010 (0.4) 
0.000 (1.3) 
0.011 (2.0) 
0.046 (0.6) 
0.014 (3.9) 
0.020 (5.2) 
0.017 (3.5) 
-0.001 (0.5) 
-0.001 (0.5) 
0.000 (0.7) 
0.004 (0.7) 
-0.014 (0.3) 
-0.051 (1.4) 
0.025 (1.0) 
0.082 (2.1) 
-0.034 (1.4) 
0.008 (1.0) 
-0.154 (3.0) 
-0.072 (1.8) 
0.000 (0.5) 
0.007 (0.7) 
0.210 (1.5) 
0.044 (7.2) 
0.035 (5.9) 
0.085(10.4) 
-0.003 (0.7) 
-0.000 (0.1) 
-0.000 (0.1) 
0.004 (0.4) 
0.106 (1.4) 
-0.052 (0.8) 
0.028 (0.6) 
0.043 (1.8) 
-0.010(0.6) 
-0.001 (0.3) 
-0.053 (1.9) 
0.003 (0.1) 
0.000 (1.1) 
0.014 (2.6) 
0.041 (0.6) 
0.015 (4.3) 
0.019 (5.3) 
0.017 (3.7) 
-0.001 (0.2) 
-0.004 (1.5) 
-0.000 (0.9) 
0.005 (0.9) 
-0.033 (0.8) 
-0.039 (1.1) 
0.021 (0.9) 
0.216 (5.5) 
-0.102(3.5) 
-0.000 (0.0) 
-0.141 (3.0) 
-0.102 (3.0) 
0.001 (2.1) 
-0.002 (0.3) 
-0.103 (0.9) 
0.021 (3.7) 
0.033 (5.8) 
0.057 (7.5) 
0.004 (1.1) 
0.003 (0.9) 
-0.000 (0.7) 
0.011 (1.2) 
0.087 (1.2) 
-0.069 (1.1) 
-0.009 (0.2) 
-0.009 (0.2) 
-0.034 (5.1) 
-0.012 (1.3) 
0.077 (1.3) 
0.130 (2.7) 
0.000 (0.2) 
-0.027 (2.2) 
0.228 (1.3) 
0.037 (5.4) 
0.012 (1.8) 
-0.005 (0.5) 
0.009 (1.8) 
-0.004 (0.9) 
0.000 (0.4) 
0.019 (1.7) 
-0.145 (1.8) 
-0.145 (2.0) 
-0.820(14.3) 
0.119 (3.5) 
-2.003 (7.2) 
-0.010 (1.5) 
0.118 (2.5) 
0.003 (0.1) 
0.000 (0.4) 
-0.006 (0.6) 
0.201 (1.5) 
-0.006 (1.1) 
-0.012 (2.1) 
0.003 (0.5) 
0.002 (0.5) 
-0.001 (0.4) 
-0.000 (0.9) 
-0.001 (0.5) 
-0.693(10.4) 
-0.115 (2.0) 
-0.011 (0.3) 
0.012 (0.3) 
-0.947 (2.5) 
0.012 (1.1) 
0.093 (1.3) 
0.004 (0.1) 
-0.001 (1.9) 
-0.020 (1.4) 
0.377 (1.8) 
-0.000 (0.0) 
-0.017 (1.9) 
0.016 (1.3) 
-0.006 (0.9) 
0.005 (0.7) 
0.000 (0.0) 
0.009 (0.7) 
-0.776 (7.7) 
-0.116 (1.3) 
0.058 (0.9) 
0.021 (0.3) 
-21.616 (7.7) 
-0.005 (0.2) 
0.539 (3.2) 
-0.194 (1.5) 
0.005 (2.5) 
0.001 (0.0) 
-0.769 (1.6) 
0.007 (0.4) 
0.008 (0.4) 
-0.020 (0.7) 
-0.005 (0.3) 
0.005 (0.3) 
0.000 (0.4) 
0.015 (0.4) 
-0.737 (3.1) 
0.415 (1.9) 
0.124 (0.9) 
0.076 (0.7) 
-7.060 (3.6) 
-0.017 (0.6) 
-0.277 (1.5) 
-0.154 (1.1) 
0.006 (2.9) 
0.006 (0.2) 
0.299 (0.6) 
-0.071 (3.4) 
-0.074 (3.3) 
-0.010 (0.3) 
-0.012 (0.8) 
0.007 (0.4) 
-0.001 (0.6) 
0.033 (1.0) 
-0.494 (2.0) 
-0.165 (0.8) 
0.278 (1.8) 
RVN 0.068/424 0.228/598 0.070/412 0.271/419 0.314/718 0.180/800 0.090/751 0.096/734 0.058/675 
Table 9.1 (continued) 
Sources: New York State Education Department, "Basic Educational Data System" (BEDS), school district tapes for 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, 
1981-82, and 1982-83 (P6,P7,PS,P9,X6,X7,XS,X9,X23). 
New York State Education Department, "Financial Data System" (ST3), school district tapes for 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, and 1982-
83 (P5yX5,X\4,X24,X25). 
New York State Education Department, "New York State Pupil Evaluation Program" (PEP), test scores for 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-
82, and 1982-83 (X22). 
New York State United Teachers, Salary Schedule Rankings, 1978-79, 1980-81, 1981-82; Salary Schedules, 1979-80; unpublished computer 
printouts, 1982-83 (Pi,P2,P3,P4,X\,X2,X3,X4,n). Information on the latter variable also came from contracts on file in the Labor-Management 
Documentation Center at the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980 Census of Population, school district data file for New York State (X\0,XU,X\2,X\3). 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, unpublished tabulations, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982 (*15). 
New York State United Teachers, "Contract Provisions," tape for 1976-77 (^21). 
Notes: Pi = percentage change in the bachelor's-level minimum salary. 
P2 = percentage change in the bachelor's-level maximum salary. 
P3 = percentage change in the master's-level minimum salary. 
P4 = percentage change in the master's-level maximum salary. 
P5 = percentage change in the school district's property tax rate on full value. 
P6 = percentage change in the teacher/student ratio. 
P7 = percentage change in the nonprofessional/student ratio (nonprofessionals include secretaries, maintenance, bus drivers, school lunch workers). 
P$ = percentage change in the other professional staff/student ratio (other professionals include administrators, psychologists, guidance counselors, 
librarians). 
P9 = percentage change in the paraprofessional/student ratio (paraprofessionals include teaching assistants, teacher aides, pupil personnel service 
aides, library aides, health aides). 
X\, X2, X3, X4 = district salary level/average salary level in the country: XX (bachelor's minimum), XI (bachelor's maximum), A3 (master's 
minimum), X4 (master's maximum). 
X5, X6, X7, XS, X9 = level at the start of the period of the outcome variable: ^ 5 (school district's tax on full value), X6 (teacher/student ratio), XI 
(nonprofessional/student ratio), ^ 8 (other professional staff/student ratio), X9 (paraprofessional/student ratio). 
^10 = percent urban residents of the school district in 1979. 
X\\ = percent nonwhite residents of the school district in 1979. 
XX2 = percent of households in the school district with children at home in 1979. 
X\3 = median family income in the school district in 1979 (in thousands). 
X\4 = 1 = city school district where school board sets tax rate; 0 = voters vote on tax rate in annual referendum. 
XX 5 = percentage change in per capita personal income in the county between the calendar years. 
X\6 = 1 = 1980-81 academic year; 0 = otherwise ^ 
XXI = X = 1981-82 academic year; 0 = otherwise I 1979-80 is the reference year. 
^18 = 1 = 1982-83 academic year; 0 = otherwise J 
XX9 = 1 = class size provision is in the teachers' contract; 0 = no provision. 
X20 = 1 = reduction-in-force provision is in the teachers' contract; 0 = no provision. 
X2X = index of number of provisions present in the teachers' contract (mean = 20, variance = 24 in the sample). 
X22 = index of student test scores in the district relative to statewide average during the 1979-80 to 1981-82 period (1 = mean, low index equals 
higher test scores; see text). 
X23 = percentage change in enrollment in the district. 
X24 = percentage change in state aid received by the district multiplied by the initial share of state aid in the district's budget. 
A75 = percentage change in the full value of property in the school district. 
n = X = negotiations with teachers over salary took place in the year; 0 = no negotiations. 
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contract negotiations took place. Table 9.2 presents similar estimates 
without this restriction on the sample; not surprisingly, sample sizes 
in the latter table are typically twice as large (many teachers' contracts 
in New York State were for two years during the period). The estimates 
in the latter table do contain a dummy variable (n) for whether nego-
tiations took place in the year, and both tables also include year dummy 
variables to control for omitted year-specific factors like the average 
growth of wages and prices in the state. The inclusion of these year 
dummies is not an innocuous modification; in principle they may cap-
ture the effects of year-to-year variations in the average rate of change 
of other included variables, leaving the coefficients of these variables 
(e.g., state aid) to capture only within-year variations of rates of change 
across districts. However, as we shall indicate later, excluding the year 
dummies rarely significantly altered the coefficients of other variables 
of "interest (e.g., state aid). 
The results in tables 9.1 and 9.2 are not particularly impressive; 
statistically insignificant coefficients predominate and the explanatory 
power of the models is not high. Nonetheless, there are a few results 
worth noting. First, we are much more successful in explaining salary 
increases for experienced teachers than we are in explaining salary 
increases for newly hired teachers. This is not surprising as during the 
period enrollments were not expanding and there was little hiring of 
new teachers. As such, teachers' unions paid relatively little attention 
to starting salaries, and in a number of cases no increases were given 
at that level. 
Second, at the maximum salary level there did tend to be a policy 
of "regression to the mean," in the sense that the higher a district's 
salary relative to the county average, the smaller the district's increase 
would be. This effect was quite small though; a district whose salary 
level was 10 percent above the county average would moderate its 
increase by no more than 1 percent. Similar results hold for the tax 
rate outcome; districts with high initial tax rates have smaller rates of 
growth of tax rates, ceteris paribus.9 
Third, the growth of "ability to pay" measures, such as county 
income (X\5) and the full value of property in a district (Z25), appeared 
to rarely influence the outcome variables. The only exception was the 
district's tax rate on full value CP5); indeed one cannot reject the hy-
pothesis that a 10 percent increase in property values was associated 
with an equivalent percent decrease in the tax rate. 
Fourth, contrary to our expectations, city school districts (XI4) in 
which the school board sets the tax rate tended to have lower rates of 
tax rate increase than districts in which voters approved the tax rate 
at an annual budget referendum. Quantitatively, however, this effect 
was very small, less than 0.03 percent a year. 
Table 9.2 Change in Outcome Equations: All Observations3 (absolute value t statistic) 
P\ Pi Pi PA P5 Pe Pi Ps P9 
c 
n 
X\ 
X2 
X3 
X4 
X5 
X6 
X7 
* 8 
X9 
X\0 
XU 
X\2 
X\3 
X\4 
X\5 
X\6 
X\l 
x\s 
X\9 
*20 
X2\ 
^22 
*23 
JT24 
X25 
0.036 (1.8) 
-0.003 (2.6) 
0.013 (0.8) 
0.000 (0.1) 
-0.011 (0.6) 
-0.001 (0.0) 
0.000 (1.4) 
0.003 (0.9) 
-0.069 (1.3) 
0.009 (4.2) 
0.018 (7.8) 
0.014 (5.2) 
0.001 (0.8) 
0.002 (1.0) 
-0.000 (1.5) 
0.006 (1.5) 
0.014 (0.5) 
-0.024 (1.1) 
-0.001 (0.1) 
0.030 (1.2) 
-0.002 (0.8) 
0.009 (0.5) 
0.010 (2.1) 
-0.044 (1.3) 
-0.041 (1.6) 
0.000 (0.4) 
-0.002 (0.4) 
0.088 (0.9) 
0.028 (7.0) 
0.027 (6.8) 
0.076(14.8) 
0.000 (0.1) 
0.003 (1.2) 
0.000 (0.2) 
0.006 (0.9) 
0.059 (1.3) 
-0.049 (1.2) 
0.032 (1.1) 
0.052 (3.1) 
-0.004 (2.8) 
-0.005 (0.4) 
0.002 (0.7) 
-0.026 (1.4) 
-0.005 (0.4) 
0.000 (1.3) 
0.005 (1.3) 
-0.011 (0.2) 
0.009 (3.6) 
0.018 (7.5) 
0.017 (5.7) 
0.001 (0.6) 
0.002 (1.2) 
-0.000 (2.0) 
0.006 (1.6) 
0.016 (0.6) 
-0.007 (0.3) 
0.000 (0.0) 
0.142 (5.8) 
-0.006 (2.5) 
-0.061 (3.4) 
0.004 (1.0) 
-0.053 (1.9) 
-0.031 (1.4) 
0.000 (0.4) 
0.001 (0.1) 
-0.095 (1.2) 
0.014 (4.3) 
0.032 (8.7) 
0.065(14.7) 
0.004 (1.8) 
0.002 (1.0) 
-0.000 (0.9) 
0.004 (0.8) 
0.033 (0.8) 
-0.028 (0.7) 
-0.015 (0.6) 
0.019 (0.8) 
-0.001 (0.2) 
-0.027 (6.2) 
-0.011 (1.8) 
0.008 (0.8) 
0.104 (3.2) 
-0.000 (0.5) 
-0.017 (2.0) 
0.250 (2.2) 
0.043 (9.3) 
0.014 (2.7) 
-0.001 (0.3) 
0.004 (1.2) 
-0.003 (1.0) 
0.000 (0.0) 
0.011 (1.5) 
-0.029 (0.5) 
-0.081 (1.5) 
-0.860(21.5) 
0.121 (5.1) 
-0.002 (0.7) 
-1.985(10.0) 
-0.010 (2.2) 
0.098 (3.0) 
0.005 (0.2) 
0.000 (0.0) 
-0.007 (1.1) 
0.083 (0.9) 
0.000 (0.0) 
-0.004 (1.1) 
0.008 (1.5) 
0.003 (1.2) 
-0.004 (1.2) 
-0.001 (1.8) 
0.006 (0.9) 
-0.717(15.3) 
-0.062 (1.5) 
-0.016 (0.6) 
0.055 (1.8) 
-0.008 (2.0) 
-1.500 (6.1) 
0.002 (0.2) 
0.026 (0.5) 
0.006 (0.1) 
0.000 (1.0) 
-0.003 (0.3) 
0.364 (2.5) 
-0.000 (1.7) 
-0.026 (0.4) 
0.003 (0.5) 
0.002 (0.3) 
0.005 (1.0) 
-0.001 (2.9) 
-0.001 (0.1) 
-0.792(11.5) 
0.004 (0.1) 
0.017 (0.3) 
0.227 (3.1) 
0.008 (0.9) 
-21.990(11.4) 
0.002 (0.1) 
0.243 (2.1) 
-0.272 (3.0) 
0.005 (3.7) 
-0.022 (1.0) 
-0.040 (0.1) 
0.023 (1.7) 
-0.001 (0.1) 
0.000 (0.0) 
0.002 (0.2) 
0.007 (0.7) 
0.000 (0.3) 
0.018 (0.8) 
-0.436 (2.8) 
0.018 (0.1) 
-0.070 (0.7) 
-0.010 (0.1) 
-0.011 (1.2) 
- 10.009 (7.8) 
-0.037 (2.2) 
0.104 (0.8) 
-0.047 (0.5) 
0.006 (4.4) 
-0.017 (0.7) 
0.313 (1.0) 
-0.067 (4.7) 
-0.063 (4.0) 
-0.017 (0.8) 
0.007 (0.6) 
0.004 (0.4) 
-0.000 (0.1) 
0.024 (1.0) 
-0.723 (4.3) 
0.154 (1.0) 
0.088 (0.8) 
RVN 0.095/922 0.239/1,205 0.100/893 0.358/904 0.321/1,504 0.168/1,664 0.111/1,553 0.084/1,509 0.081/1,390 
lSee notes to table 9.1 for variable definitions. 
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Fifth, the results in table 9.2 suggest that teacher salary increases 
were actually marginally lower in the years that contracts were ne-
gotiated than they were in second and third years of existing contracts. 
This may reflect the well-known preferences of management to "back-
load" salary increases in multiyear contracts to reduce the present 
value of the cost. 
Finally, we turn to the effects of changes in state aid to education— 
the primary focus of our study. Table 9.3 summarizes the aid coefficients 
from tables 9.1 and 9.2 as well as comparable coefficients that came 
from models that excluded the year dummy variables and, in the case 
of the "whole sample results" the negotiations dummy. Exclusion of 
the year dummies allow us to test if their presence captures some of 
the effects of across-year variations in increases in aid to education. 
Rows Al, A2 and Bl to B4 of table 9.3 report estimates of the effects 
of changes in state aid when such changes are treated as exogenous. 
Although these coefficients are often insignificant and/or differ across 
specifications, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. Changes in 
state aid levels did not appear to influence teacher salary increases (PI, 
P2, P3, P4). There is some evidence in the specifications that include 
the year dummy variables that they negatively affected tax rate growth; 
however, this relationship was far from one to one. Unexpectedly, in 
some specifications increases in aid were associated with decreases in 
teacher/student ratios, but increases in other professional/student ratios. 
Of course, as noted in section 9.2, changes in state aid to school 
districts in New York State were not truly exogenous during the 1978— 
79 to 1982-83 period. Rather they depended each year on (among other 
things) changes in the district's full value of property and enrollment, 
changes in the district's income level (after 1980-81), whether the 
district was a city school district, and "save harmless" provisions, 
with the effect of each of these variables often varying across years. 
Treating aid changes as being exogenous may distort our estimates, 
given these facts. 
To address this problem, table 9.4 reports estimates of two simple 
specifications used by us to analyze the determinants of the percentage 
change in state aid. In the first, percentage changes in aid are regressed 
on year dummy variables and these variables interacted with the city 
school district dummy, the percentage change in assessed value, the 
percentage change in enrollment, and the 1979 income level in the 
community. The second attempts to approximate the existence of "save 
harmless" provisions by adding a dummy variable if the percentage 
change in enrollment in the year is negative and interacting one minus 
that variable with the changes in full value of district property and 
enrollment, and with income.10 
Table 9.3 Effects of State Aid Changes on Outcomes: Various Specifications8 (absolute value t statistics) 
Specification [number of observations] 
A) Contracts Negotiated in the Year 
Al) Include Year Dummies 
A2) Exclude Year Dummies 
A3) Include Year Dummies (IV1) 
A4) Include Year Dummies (IV2) 
B) All Years' Data 
Bl) Include Year and Negotiations 
Dummies 
B2) Exclude Negotiations Dummies 
B3) Exclude Year Dummies 
B4) Neither Included 
P\ 
[425] 
-0.051 
(1.4) 
-0.057 
(1.5) 
0.066 
(0.5) 
0.279 
(2.6) 
[923] 
-0.024 
(1.1) 
-0.019 
(0.8) 
-0.034 
(1.6) 
-0.026 
(1.1) 
PI 
[599] 
-0.052 
(0.8) 
-0.022 
(0.3) 
0.071 
(0.3) 
0.014 
(0.1) 
[1,206] 
-0.049 
(1.2) 
-0.017 
(0.4) 
-0.030 
(0.7) 
-0.004 
(0.1) 
P3 
[413] 
-0.039 
(1.1) 
-0.040 
(1.1) 
0.119 
(1.0) 
0.138 
(1.4) 
[894] 
-0.007 
(0.3) 
-0.005 
(0.2) 
-0.029 
(1.3) 
-0.024 
(1.0) 
PA 
[420] 
-0.069 
(1.2) 
-0.113 
(1.8) 
0.007 
(0.0) 
0.061 
(0.4) 
[905] 
-0.028 
(0.7) 
-0.045 
(1.1) 
-0.023 
(0.7) 
-0.038 
(1.0) 
P5 
[728] 
-0.145 
(2.0) 
-0.081 
(1.0) 
-0.122 
(0.5) 
0.189 
(0.9) 
[1,504] 
-0.081 
(1.5) 
0.019 
(0.3) 
-0.103 
(2.1) 
-0.006 
(0.1) 
P6 
[801] 
-0.115 
(2.0) 
-0.123 
(2.2) 
-0.951 
(4.3) 
-0.762 
(4.5) 
[1,665] 
-0.062 
(1.5) 
-0.060 
(1.5) 
0.050 
(1.3) 
-0.049 
(1.3) 
PI 
[752] 
-0.116 
(1.2) 
-0.108 
(1.2) 
-0.490 
(1.5) 
-0.293 
(1.1) 
[1,554] 
0.004 
(0.1) 
-0.013 
(0.2) 
-0.034 
(0.5) 
-0.048 
(0.8) 
PS 
[735] 
0.415 
(1.9) 
0.428 
(2.0) 
-0.156 
(0.2) 
-0.474 
(0.7) 
[151] 
0.018 
(0.1) 
0.073 
(0.5) 
0.090 
(0.6) 
0.135 
(0.9) 
P9 
[676] 
-0.165 
(0.8) 
-0.241 
(1.1) 
-2.216 
(2.9) 
- 1.492 
(2.5) 
[1,391] 
0.154 
(1.0) 
0.046 
(0.3) 
0.085 
(0.6) 
-0.009 
(0.9) 
Coefficients come from equations in tables 9.1 and 9.2 and similar equations which included the indicated dummy variables. To derive elasticities 
with respect to state aid, these coefficients should be divided by the share of state aid in the initial budget—approximately 40 percent in the sample— 
where outcomes are the percentage changes in: 
P\ = minimum salary with bachelor's degree. P6 = teacher/student ratio. 
P2 = maximum salary with bachelor's degree. PI = nonprofessional/student ratio. 
P3 = minimum salary with master's degree. PS = other professional/student ratio. 
PA = maximum salary with master's degree. P9 = paraprofessional/student ratio. 
P5 = school district property tax rate on full value. 
IV1(IV2) = instrument for percentage change in aid obtained from columns (1) and (2) of table 9.4. 
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Table 9.4 Annual Percentage Change in State Aid Equations: Observations 
When Negotiations Took Place (absolute value of t statistics) 
Explanatory Explanatory 
Variables 
C 
Y80 
Y81 
Y82 
*14*Y79 
*14*Y80 
*14*Y81 
X14*Y82 
X25*Y19 
X25*Y80 
X25*Y81 
*25*Y82 
*23*Y79 
*23*Y80 
*23*Y81 
*23*Y82 
*13*Y80 
A13*Y81 
R2/N 
(1) 
0.056 (5.6) 
0.048 (2.6) 
0.047 (2.5) 
0.076 (3.9) 
0.050 (3.5) 
0.039 (2.6) 
-0.007 (0.4) 
-0.009 (0.5) 
0.004 (0.1) 
-0.097 (1.4) 
-0.169 (2.0) 
-0.087 (1.0) 
0.270 (2.3) 
0.197 (2.0) 
0.530 (4.1) 
0.198 (1.5) 
-0.001 (1.2) 
-0.001 (0.8) 
— 
0.083/1,001 
Variables 
C 
Y80 
Y81 
Y82 
*14*Y79 
X14*Y80 
X14*Y81 
X14*Y82 
*25*Y79*(1 -
*25*Y80*(1 -
X25*Y81*(1 -
X25*Y82*(1 -
*23*Y79*(1 -
*23*Y80*(1 -
*23*Y81*0 -
X23*Y82*(1 -
*13*Y80 
*13*Y81*(1 -
D 
D) 
D) 
D) 
D) 
D) 
D) 
D) 
D) 
D) 
(2) 
0.066 (3.3) 
0.038 (2.7) 
0.010 (1.7) 
0.018 (3.0) 
0.052 (3.7) 
0.047 (3.3) 
-0.007 (0.5) 
0.008 (0.5) 
-0.141 (0.5) 
-0.203 (0.6) 
-1.400 (4.8) 
-0.053 (1.4) 
-0.126 (0.2) 
0.498 (2.0) 
0.321 (0.3) 
0.885 (1.9) 
-0.001 (0.1) 
0.011 (5.2) 
-0.020 (1.0) 
0.108/1,001 
Note: C = intercept term. 
Yj• = 1 = change from academic year 19/ — 1 to 19/ to academic year 19/ to 19/ + 1; 
0 = other. 
D — 1 = percentage change in enrollment was negative, 0 = not negative. 
X\3, *14, Z23, *25 are as defined before. 
The estimates in table 9.4 can then be used to obtain instruments 
(IV1 and IV2) for the percentage change in state aid in each district, 
these estimated values interacted with the initial share of state aid in 
the district's budget, and then the outcome equations reestimated using 
the instruments rather than the actual values of percentage changes in 
state aid. Rows A3 and A4 of table 9.3 contain the estimated state aid 
coefficients from equations estimated for the "negotiations only" sam-
ple when year dummies were included, along with the instruments for 
percentage change in state aid. Unfortunately, these results do differ 
substantially from the OLS ones. While in the preferred specification 
(IV2, row A4) there is evidence that higher state aid was associated 
with higher bachelor's level entry salaries, we no longer observe in-
creased state aid displacing increases in the tax rate. Moreover, in-
creases in state aid now appear to be negatively associated with both 
teacher/student and paraprofessional/student ratios. The magnitude of 
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the latter relationship is sufficiently large to make one question what 
we have found.11 
9.5 Concluding Remarks 
Sometimes the best laid plans of mice and men (and economists) go 
astray. To be blunt, the results presented above shed very little light 
on the effects of changes in state aid and other financial variables on 
teacher salaries, tax rates, and staff/student ratios. While there was 
some evidence that aid increases moderate tax rate increases, this 
relationship was not sufficiently robust across different model speci-
fications to draw firm conclusions. 
There are many possible explanations for our failure to find system-
atic significant effects of financial variables. There were many errors 
in the underlying financial data we used, which we tried to correct but 
may not have always succeeded. School district residents' income was 
unavailable, save for 1979, so instead we had to use county income as 
a proxy. Parts of aid increases were often tied to specific uses (e.g., 
textbooks, transportation, special needs), and our use of total state aid 
rather than general operating aid may have distorted our findings. 
More importantly, it is possible that school districts did not make 
major allocation decisions based on changes in financial variables that 
were thought to be uncertain to persist in the future. For example, 
granting teachers a large salary increase in a year of generous aid 
increases would come back to haunt a district if aid remained constant 
or fell in the next year. As such, we may well have performed the wrong 
conceptual experiment. Our quasi-experimental design may not have 
been appropriate to capture what the effects would be of a "perma-
nent" federal program that mandated increased aid to education. 
In fact, while year-to-year average percentage increases in state aid 
varied during the sample period, the average share of state aid in total 
school district revenue remained roughly constant at 40 percent.12 
Changes in state aid formulas during the period did serve to redistribute 
state aid across school districts each year, however the aid changes 
were so weakly correlated across school districts over time that for all 
practical purposes above, or below, average increases were probably 
treated as random events.13 As such, they probably affected things like 
the timing of capital expenditures and the issuance and retirement of 
debt much more than they did the outcomes on which we have focused 
in this paper. 
Lest we appear too pessimistic, however, we hasten to stress that 
our paper has found some results, primarily relating to more "insti-
tutional" variables, that are of interest. For example, teacher salary 
increases tended to be smaller in years when contracts were negotiated; 
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school districts seemed to be successful in "backloading" wage in-
creases in multiyear contracts. Or to take another example, city school 
districts, where elected school boards set the tax rate, appeared to have 
lower tax rate increases than other districts. In addition, we observed 
a regression to the mean phenomenon as school districts whose teach-
ers' salaries were above the county average tended to have lower rates 
of salary increase. The latter result is exactly what one would expect 
to see with a system of impasse resolution (mediation and fact finding), 
where neutrals place a weight on comparability in making decisions.14 
While we attempted to obtain data on whether each negotiation went 
to impasse in order to test whether comparability considerations mat-
tered primarily in negotiations that went to impasse, unfortunately such 
data were not available. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that state legislatures have begun to 
realize what we have found econometrically; namely, that past state 
aid increases to school districts (at least in New York State) have not 
been used to increase teachers' salaries. As a result, recently enacted 
laws in a number of states have provided increased state aid earmarked 
for specified higher minimum salaries for teachers (e.g., New Jersey) 
or increased aid for general teachers' salaries, with school districts and 
teachers' unions to negotiate how these funds are to be allocated (e.g., 
New York).15 Whether these targeted programs actually serve to in-
crease teachers' salaries above the level that would have existed in 
their absence, especially in the long run, is a subject worthy of future 
empirical investigation. 
Notes 
1. See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1987) and Lipsky (1982) for surveys of the 
teacher compensation literature. 
2. Examples of studies on the effects of grants on public school expenditure 
levels are Denzau (1975) and Feldstein (1975). Studies on determinants of cross-
section variations in expenditure shares include Carroll (1976) and Monk (1984). 
3. Much of the discussion in this section is derived from our reading of New 
York State Education Department (1978, 1980) and New York State Division 
of the Budget (1979, 1981, 1982). We are grateful to David Monk for calling 
this material to our attention. 
4. The following table, which lists the values of EL and EH each year and 
their percentage changes from the previous year (in parentheses), illustrates 
the variability in the percentage changes over time. 
1978-79 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1982-83 
EL $1,450 $1,500 (3.4%) $1,600 (6.7%) $1,650 (3.1%) $1,885 (14.2%) 
EH $1,500 $1,550 (3.3%) $1,700 (9.7%) $1,885 (10.9%) $2,155 (14.3%) 
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5. Nonprofessional staff includes secretaries, maintenance workers, bus driv-
ers, and school lunch workers. Other professional staff include administrators, 
psychologists, guidance counselors, and librarians. Paraprofessionals include 
teaching assistants, teacher aides, pupil personnel service aides, library aides, 
and health aides. 
6. In actuality, annual income data were available only at the county level. 
7. Whether a contract negotiation took place in a year was obtained from 
information in the wage data sources and a search of teachers' contracts on 
file in the data archives of the Labor-Management Documentation Center of 
the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations. 
8. These collective bargaining provision variables were available on tape 
only for the 1975-76 academic year and thus represent the strength of the 
contract prior to the first year in the sample. We are grateful to Randall Eberts 
of the University of Oregon for providing these data. They have previously 
been used in Eberts and Stone (1986). 
9. The large negative coefficients of the initial level of the outcome variable 
in columns P6 to P9 are undoubtedly biased in a negative direction since in 
each case were are regressing the log {OtIOt - 1) on Or - 1 (where O rep-
resents an outcome). 
10. In specification 1 district income was not interacted with the 1979-80 
year dummy because income did not enter the aid allocation formula until the 
next year. Similarly, in specification 2 the interaction of income and the 1980-
81 year dummy was not further interacted with D because the ''save harmless" 
provisions did not apply to aid based on district income in 1980-81. Deflating 
median family income by the proportion of households with children at home 
(to approximate a persistent income measure) did not appreciably alter any of 
the estimates. Income for 1979 in the district was used throughout because it 
was the only year that district (as opposed to county) income data were available. 
11. One further extension warrants being briefly reported here. During the 
period covered by the study, enrollment was declining in many school districts 
in New York State; indeed in roughly 80 percent of the district/year obser-
vations in our sample enrollment fell. Discussants of previous drafts of our 
paper have suggested that the response* of school districts to changes in state 
aid may differ between increasing and decreasing enrollment districts. (See 
Calvin, Murnane, and Brown 1985 for evidence that in Michigan the response 
of school district expenditure levels to enrollment changes differed between 
increasing and decreasing enrollment districts.) 
To test for this possibility, the equations that underlie rows Bl and B3 of 
table 9.3 were reestimated for both increasing enrollment and decreasing en-
rollment subsamples of school district-year observations. The patterns of re-
sults observed were very similar to those reported in table 9.3 with the vast 
majority of coefficients again proving statistically insignificant. The absolute 
magnitudes of the coefficients tended to be larger for the increasing enrollment 
districts, but these differences across enrollment change types were all statis-
tically insignificant. 
12. More precisely the shares of state aid in total school district revenue in 
New York State (excluding New York City) were 39.9, 39.9, 39.8, and 40.4, 
respectively, for 1979-80, 1980-81, 1981-82, and 1982-83. See New York 
State Office of the Comptroller (1985, table C). 
13. For the roughly 700 school districts in our sample, the computed cor-
relations of total and per student state aid changes (from the previous academic 
year) across school districts over time were as follows: 
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1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
Total Aid 
0.221 
0.151 -0.202 
-0.011 0.060 -0.102 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
Per Student Aid 
0.052 
0.175 -0.096 
-0.022 -0.048 -0.053 
1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 
14. Previous studies of actual public sector labor markets have found that 
when arbitration statutes are present area wage differentials tend to be com-
pressed. See Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1987) for citations to these studies. 
15. For brief discussions of the New York and New Jersey programs, see 
David Dunlap (1986) and Alfonso Narvaez (1985), respectively. These programs 
raise a host of other issues including their effects on mandated and bargained 
fringe benefit costs, on the seniority structure of teachers' salaries, and on 
collective bargaining in education, per se, which we do not discuss here. 
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